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2 A classic non-debate
Section I: The actual debate
1 It was twenty years ago today...
Almost twenty years after the debate in 1975 between Chomsky and Piaget on language and
learning at the Royaumont Abbey (Piattelli-Palmarini, 1980), Piattelli-Palmarini (1994, p. 316)
makes up the balance: 'In fact, as time goes by, it is increasingly clear that the pendulum is presently
swinging towards the innatist research program in linguistics presented at Royaumont by Chomsky
... and away from even the basic, and allegedly most "innocent", assumptions of the constructivist
Piagetian program'. Probably, many infant and language development researchers will agree
wholeheartedly but I want to show that things are much more complicated.
It seems that nativism is indeed propagated by default, especially by infant researchers.
Karmiloff-Smith (1991, p. 173), for instance, states that 'All the neonate and infancy data that are
accumulating serve to suggest that the nativists won the battle in accounting for the initial structure of
the human mind'. In this chapter the debate on language acquisition between Piaget's constructivist
theory and Chomsky's nativism is analyzed. Identifying which parties took part in the debate, and
what their expectations were, and analysing the arguments and counter arguments presented will
make it clear that there never was a real exchange of thoughts. In the second section I present a
discussion in which I try to identify the implicit assumptions underlying the theories of Chomsky and
Fodor. In doing so, I shall show that the basic assumptions of the theories of Chomsky and Fodor
are the same as those of computational theory in general. To be more precise, I take these basic
assumptions to be those about rules and representations. To identify the problems in their
'representationalism', I link Fodor's and Chomsky's positions to classic Artificial Intelligence (AI)
theorizing, another instance of computational theory. Recently, AI has been criticized by theorists
who stress self-organization and the factual embodiment of the systems under consideration. These
theorists, working within the framework of Artificial Life, sometimes refer explicitly to Piaget as a
founding father of this new field of computer science. From the discussion of the assumptions
underlying Chomsky's and Fodor's winning position in the debate, it will be concluded first that
Chomskyan nativism does not provide an explanation of the problems with Piagetian theory which
were correctly identified, and second that some additional aspects of Piagetian theory might still be
worth discussing. In fact the 'case' needs to be re-opened because newly available evidence
weakens the position of the `winners' of the 1975 debate and to some extent amplifies the arguments
of Piaget, which were considered to be invalid in the debate.
The participants in the debate were pioneers in the field of neurobiology, among others
Nobel laureates like Jacob and Monod. It may appear curious that these pioneers from molecular
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biology (genetics) attended and even organized a debate between the founders of genetic
epistemology (Piaget) and generative linguistics (Chomsky), two conceptual systems most frequently
associated with the scientific disciplines of psychology and language. Why was that? With respect to
psychology and language, Piattelli-Palmarini (1994) writes that the molecular biologists who
organized the debate `knew very little, but they liked what they knew, on both sides. There was
every reason ... to expect these two schools to find a compromise, and that this grand unified
metatheory would fit well within modern molecular biology' (p. 322).  Piattelli-Palmarini continues
that `Both systems relied heavily on "deeper" structures, on universals, on precise logico-
mathematical schemes, on general biological assumptions' (p. 322) and that this was 'music to a
biologist's ears' (p. 322). The organizers were hoping that the debate would both shed new light
upon, and catalyze a discussion about their own biological assumptions. Such a biological
'expectation' for their meeting was significant for both Chomsky and Piaget, albeit for different
reasons. Piaget had great interest in biology as well as psychology. He was a trained biologist
himself. Chomsky was known to rely on biology to explain his proposed mental organs; to him
human biology must finally explain the evolution of the inborn universal generative structures that he
and his MIT group assumed. So although the context in which the debate took place was certainly
not that of pioneers within the fields of psychology (as was to be expected), linguistics or even
epistemology, it did make sense. As a consequence of the biological background of the debate,
however, it is impossible to re-elucidate the debate without giving an account of certain biological
assumptions. In this chapter, I first want to show how the debate actually proceeded in 1975. More
precisely, I want to show how the strong and recurrent similarities between Chomsky's program and
molecular genetics in the '70's, enabled Chomsky to get the (invisible) multitude of biologists on his
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Figure 2. In chapter 2, zero option (nativism) is the central theme, which is pitted against the second option.
2 Developmental theory according to nativists and epigenists
In part, the debate is about conceptions of development. Conceptions of development are
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fundamental to both psychological and biological theorizing. It is here that we witness a clash in
interests. Developmental theory seems to be the only issue in which Piaget is really interested.
However, Chomsky never engages in a debate on developmental theoretical issues. Obviously, both
men are departing from different positions, but, in the debate these differences are not made explicit.
To Piaget the debate was not only a debate about language (as was implied by Chomsky), it also
was a debate about the question whether a developmental psychology of language is possible at all.
The position taken on ontogenetic novelty determines the possibility or improbability of a
developmental theory of ontogeny. More precisely, by stating that grammar is innately given in the
form of a language organ, Chomsky denies the existence of the ontogenetic dimension of
development with respect to the emergence of grammar. To Chomsky, evolutionary theory must
explain the emergence of a language organ, and probably of other mental organs as well. In
(developmental) psychology, the typical level of abstraction is that of ontogenetic development
(ontogeny). Chomsky rules out developmental psychology by denying the ontogenetic dimension in
development. Therefore, Chomsky's position could potentially bring psychology into bankruptcy.
Piaget seemed to be aware of this. He repeatedly argued that nativism is biologically implausible, for
instance by showing that traditional evolutionary theory cannot itself explain the emergence of
cognitive organs any better than ontogenetic theories. The biologists strongly disagreed on this. To
them evolutionary theory was still their indisputable hard core. Before discussing the real debate, we
shall briefly elaborate on possible theoretical conceptions of development and innateness.
From one point of view, the debate is just another instance of questioning whether or not it is
useful to divide behavior into an inherited and an acquired part (just like the nature-nurture debate
was some decennia ago). To begin, a few notes on the key concept in the debate: the term innate.
There is no single definition of innate: 'At least six meanings are attached to the term: present at birth;
a behavioral difference caused by a genetic difference; adapted over the course of evolution;
unchanging throughout development; shared by all member of a species; and not learned' (Bateson,
1991, p. 21). According to Bateson (1985), 'innate' most commonly means 'not learned', and refers
to behavior that evolves without prior individual experience with the stimulus responded to, or
without preceding practice of the motor patterns performed. In this definition, a difference is implied
between experience that has a specific influence on behavioral responses, like training and learning,
and experience causing general effects, like oxygen and food. Innate behavior is not conceived of as
behavior which occurs without experience in the general sense, for behavior would be impossible if
that definition is adopted. Bateson concludes that '(I)nnate behavior, according to the most popular
(and most questionable) definition, develops without the specific experience that could give the
behavior pattern its particular character' (1985, p. 4). Ducklings, for example, show a species-
specific responsiveness to the calls of their mother as soon as they are born (Gottlieb, 1991).
Broadly speaking, a dichotomy in the conceptualization of development lies behind the
arguments over the value of the distinction between innate and acquired behavior. The first extreme
position, sometimes called the innateness view or nativism, advocates the distinction. It somehow
assumes a simple relationship between the starting point of development and its end point.
Chomsky's computational theory of an innate language system of rules and representations, the
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Universal Grammar which is assumed to be established in an innate language organ (Language
Acquisition Device, or LAD), can be placed at this extreme. Some behavior, for example displaying
syntactic structures in language acquisition, is assumed to be dependent on preexisting (genetic)
information, and is not (or only slightly) modifiable by learning once it has been expressed. Nativism
defines the mental model in terms of (computational) rules which are assumed to be pre-
programmed in the brain. The access which the system has to its environment is 'solely in terms of
the mental model 'represented', at any given moment, in the brain' (Sinha, 1985, p. 165).
Computational rules are in no sense derived from the environment, they are `innate algorithms
enabling the system to select relevant features of input to construct the environment' (pp. 165-166).
In psychology, the computational approach is radically nativistic, because `innate algorithms enable
the subject to select from environmental input only those features which are either developmentally
or currently relevant to the construction process at hand' (p. 166).
The other extreme position does not advocate the value of the distinction between innate
and acquired behavior. It states that the current state of an organism influences which genes or
organismic possibilities are expressed and this current state of the organism feeds back on the
external world by influencing it. It is sometimes called the epigenetic view. Epigenetic theories in
psychology are often associated with the work of two theorists, Vygotsky and Piaget. To Piaget,
individual development is a transformation from relatively homogeneous and simple beginnings
towards complexity. The part of Piaget's theory that tries to account for the emergence of language
is sometimes called a cognition-first theory (Rosenberg, 1993). Cognition-first theories claim that
language acquisition is bound to the elaboration of cognitive structures in general: 'intellectual
development is possible without language, but language acquisition is bound to the elaboration of
cognitive structures in general' (Sinclair, 1975, p. 255). In short, language is not possible without the
development of other cognitive structures. Cognition-first theories have difficulty explaining why
persons with serious mental retardation sometimes nevertheless show linguistic abilities far beyond
their non-linguistic status. For example, in some forms of pathology (Williams syndrome), people are
perfectly able to exploit the generative nature of morphologic (or syntactic) structure but are
completely unable to combine objects into hierarchical structures (cf. Yamada, 1990, more on this in
chapter 3). However, of course, the fact that cognition-first theories are in trouble does not
necessarily mean that preformism should be preferred to epigenism. Although it seems that recently
accumulated evidence falsifies cognition-first theories and favors nativism, in the second section I
shall argue that nativism alone cannot be a proper explanation for development. Development
supposes historical change, and searching for timeless, a-historical laws of form obscures the
dimension that developmentalists have adopted as their particular point of view. From a
developmental perspective nativism should not be used, however successful it indeed is as an
alternative to the failing developmental theories.
We will now examine the debate as it took place in 1975. To do so, we must first introduce
the parties and, consequently, the 'case' (the arguments) as it was actually presented. Scrutinizing the
case will make clear that Chomsky played the leading part and that the whole debate centered on
his arguments. Consequently, the attention attracted by Chomsky and his arguments was totally
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disproportionate to that attracted by Piaget and his ideas. This chapter focuses on the factual
debate, and so Piaget's arguments will not be discussed extensively (see chapter 6 for an extensive
discussion of Piaget's arguments).
3 The parties
There were three parties at the Abbaye de Royaumont , Piaget and his collaborators, Chomsky and
Fodor, and a third party whose representatives had not yet developed a differentiated opinion about
the theories and issues presented. At the time of the debate, Piaget was an old scientist; born in
1896 he was nearly eighty years old in 1975. Both Chomsky and Fodor were still in their forties.
The third party consisted mainly of molecular biologists, including among others, the organizers.
3.1 Piaget's epigenism
Piaget was hoping for, and aiming at collaboration with Chomsky. Apparently, he was assuming that
Chomsky and he were bound to agree on all important matters. Piaget opens the debate by stating:
I should like to begin by expressing to Noam Chomsky the admiration that I have for his
works and listing the essential points on which I think I am in agreement with him. These points are
so essential and so fundamental that the question of the heredity or innateness of language appears a
very minor one to me (Piaget, 1980, p. 57).
Of course Piaget was aware of some conflict between himself and Chomsky ('the question of the
heredity or innateness of language', Piaget, 1980, p. 57) but he continues:
I think therefore, that we agree on the basic points, and I do not see any major conflict
between Chomsky's linguistics and my own psychology. I can go so far as to say that on the issue
relating to the
relationships between language and thought, I consider myself to be in
symmetry with Chomsky (Piaget, 1980, p. 57).
From both Piaget's introduction (pp. 23-34), and his 'introductory remarks' (pp. 57-61), five central
issues which establish this convergence can be identified.
First, they both stress the inadequacy of empiricism. Piaget states that 'from the onset the
"empirical" study of the genesis of knowledge shows the insufficiency of an "empiricist" interpretation
of experience' (p. 23), and further that the 'fundamental relationship that constitutes all knowledge is
not, therefore, a mere "association" between objects, for this notion neglects the active role of the
subject, but rather the "assimilation" of objects to the schemes of that subject' (p. 24).
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A second similarity which, according to Piaget, could be the basis for the collaboration with
Chomsky, was the elaboration of the mentalistic or rationalistic approach they both envisioned, in
which logic, rules derived through deduction, principles, and 'constraints'  are stressed (p. 57).
Piaget states that transitions between stages are formally constrained by logical necessity. Transitions
are the consequences of the activity of the subject, for instance the attempt to generalize or to reach
equilibrium (p. 30).
Third, both Chomsky and Piaget assign a central role to the internal activity of the subject,
which, in the theory of Chomsky, generates the language, and, in the theory of Piaget, the objects of
thought. It should be noted, however, that the debate took place during a transitional phase in
Chomsky's theorizing. During the debate, Chomsky's conception was shifting from hypothesis
construction (Chomsky & Halle, 1968) to hypothesis selection (Chomsky, 1981) as the basis of
language learning. There was as yet no stable outcome. In hypothesis construction, the child is taken
to construct principles of the grammar to account for the input data provided by adults. In
hypothesis selection, the linguistic rules and principles are innately available. All the child has to do is
to select the appropriate value for a parametric choice on the basis of the input. In accordance with
Piagetian constructionism, hypothesis construction is data driven. However, hypothesis selection is
universal grammar (UG) driven. Along with the shift, UG became a substantive universal, in contrast
to the formal universal it once was. It is not impossible that the debate forced or drove Chomsky to
shift from construction to selection.
Fourth, development must be studied in real time, with real children, and by means of
experimentation (Piaget, 1980, p. 23).
Finally, language is the product of intelligence instead of being the outcome of a behavioristic
learning mechanism (p. 57). Piaget's attitude towards the debate is one of establishing the
collaboration with Chomsky. To Piaget, there is agreement on the basic points; he does not see any
major conflict between his psychology and Chomsky's linguistics. The only issue on which Piaget
disagrees with Chomsky is the 'innateness of the fixed nucleus' (p. 57).
Piaget did already have a kind of 'casting' in mind to establish the convergence between the two
programs. In trying to make explicit the 'division of labour' (Piattelli-Palmarini, 1994, p. 317, i.e.
labour involved in combining both theories) that Piaget must have had in mind, we can distinguish
two aspects: an aspect of content, and a methodological aspect. Piaget is mainly concerned with
conceptual and semantic development, whereas Chomsky primarily addresses 'content-independent
rules of syntactic well-formedness' across all languages (the Universal Grammar).
The compromise which Piaget must have had in mind becomes clear with the regard to the
methodological aspect. He tried to reformulate Chomsky's innateness claim as a methodological
strategy instead of as an ontological thesis. The implication of viewing nativism as a strategy instead
of as ontology would be that the existence of developmental processes would no longer be
principally rejected. Consequently the existence of developmental psychology would no longer be at
stake. To be more explicit, nativism could be acceptable to Piaget as a strategy. In this way, Piaget
tried to resolve the conflict with which the claim of innateness had confronted him - innateness is
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ontologically unacceptable from a Piagetian point of view - by declaring innateness as a strategy
complementary to his own (p. 58 and further). Piaget minimizes the role assigned to innate factors,
while Chomsky maximizes their role. The discussion should have been one about estimating the
starting point and the specificity of the 'fixed nucleus'.
Whatever similarities and disagreements Piaget perceived, however, his most important
contribution to the debate was first to question how development could be possible at all, and
second to provide tentative answers to this question. In his opening argument (pp. 23-34), he stated
his basic ideas and assumptions. These can be summarized as follows:
First, cognition is the self-organization that occurs within a system to allow it to become an remain
adaptive in an ever changing world. In this way cognition is the organism's answer to novelty (this is
a crucial point, although novelty is also a problem in Piagetian theory). Self-organization by means of
assimilation and accommodation emerges in ontogeny. It is put on top of the fixed nucleus of the
general and holistic principles that govern the cognitive system smoothly and to a large extent
automatically. In Piaget's own words:
the fundamental relationship that constitutes all knowledge is ... the
'assimilations' of objects to the schemes of that subject. This process ...
prolongs the various forms of biological 'assimilations', of which
cognitive association is a particular case as a functional process of
integration. Conversely, when objects are assimilated to schemes of
action, there is a necessary 'adaptation' to the particularities of these
objects ... It is thus this exogenous mechanism that converges with
what is valid in the empiricist thesis, but  ... adaptation does not exist
in a 'pure' or isolated state, since it is always the adaptation of an
assimilatory scheme; therefore this assimilation remains the driving
force of cognitive action (Piaget, 1980, p. 24).
Second, self-organization and self-stabilization are real features of biological systems, which can be
described in logico-mathematical schemes. With respect to self-organization through assimilation and
accommodation, Piaget states that
these mechanisms, which are visible from birth, are completely general
... The role of assimilation is recognized in the fact that an
'observable' or a 'fact' is always interpreted from the moment of its
observation, for this observation ... requires the utilization of logico-
mathematical frameworks such as the setting up of a relationship or a
correspondence, proximities or separations, positive or negative
quantifications leading to the concept of measure ... (Piaget, 1980, p.
24).
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Third, within the process of self-organization, a universal trajectory can be observed in which self-
stabilization occurs repeatedly. Stability is lost just before the system makes a transition to a next
stable state. Both assimilation and accommodation (differentiation), and adaptation (hierarchical
integration) provide us with concepts appropriate for describing the process of change that we call
development (inclusion and generalization). Piaget states that
... equilibration admits, in addition to the previous laws, of a
progressive transfer (passage) from the exogenous to the endogenous,
in the sense that perturbations ... are first nullified or neutralized, then
progressively integrated (with displacement of equilibrium), and finally
incorporated into the system as deducible intrinsic variations
reconstructing the exogenous by way of the endogenous. The
biological equivalent (compare 'from noise to order' in von Foerster)
is to be sought in 'phenocopy' (Piaget, 1980, p. 33).
Fourth, development is not blind: there exists some kind of direction or necessity to evolution.
According to Piaget, development cannot be captured completely by Darwinian random mutation
and selection. As a rule evolution is economical. It would rather throw neurons away than add new
ones. From this observation, Piaget is led to conclude that the complexity of our brains, and of
cognition, is needed to deal with the complexity of both the world and our bodies. Another theory of
evolution is needed. As we will see, this assumption was attacked in the debate by the molecular
biologists (they accused him of reintroducing a basis for a Lamarckian nightmare). It is here that we
witness a major clash between Piaget's assumptions and the assumptions then current in the
flourishing field of evolutionary biology. Given the large number of prominent biologists who engaged
in the debate, this clash would inevitably become manifest during the meeting. Consequently, this
assumption in particular made Piaget vulnerable in 1975. As we shall see in chapter 6, the very same
assumption makes Piaget's position strong in the late nineties. Piaget states it as follows:
For me, what is difficult to understand in the neo-Darwinian concept of
instincts ... is the correspondence between the hereditary formation of
morphogenesis and that of behaviors. For behavior goes beyond the
bounds of the soma and presupposes all kinds of anticipations in
relation to the external environment (Piaget, 1980, p. 242).
and further
insofar as a behavior implies a programming that oversteps the bounds
of the soma and that is well adapted to the external environment, there
are only two solutions: that of change followed by selections, the
classic but unacceptable explanation for the formation of cognitive
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structure, such as logico-mathematical structures; or the solution of a
combinatorial structure, but composed of elements indirectly influenced
by the environment (1980, p. 278).
Fifth, the developmental psychological assumption states that both the structure of language and the
structure of learning are generalizations of already developed senso-motor schemes. As a
consequence, these schemes form the logical premises for cognitive structures, like word order.
With respect to language, this means that semantic features and relations are the `prime movers',
from which syntax is derived. This assumption is basic to the cognition-first account. Stated in
Piaget's own words:
the functioning of intelligence alone is hereditary and creates structures
only through an organization of successive actions performed on
objects (Piaget, 1980, p. 23).
To summarize Piaget's assumptions, preformation or innateness cannot explain novelty because of
the dependency the innateness view on the darwinian concepts of random mutation and selection.
Once again in Piaget's own words:
... if there were innateness, reason and language would be the result of
selected accidents, but selected subsequently, after the fact, whereas the
formation itself would be the result of mutations and would therefore
occur at random ... I absolutely refuse, for my part, to think that
logico-mathematical structures would owe their origin to chance; there
is nothing fortuitous about them. These structures could not be formed
by survival selection but by an exact and detailed adaptation to reality
(Piaget, 1980, p. 59).
Piaget calls for an extension of evolutionary theory and calls for considering
... the necessity of attributing to behavior an organization by `systems'
with their 'global dynamics', although ... the mechanism remains to be
found (Piaget, 1980, p. 282).
To Piaget, reflecting on such a potential mechanism was the essence of the debate. In all his
contributions to the debate, Piaget points to the shortcomings of evolutionary theory and theorizes
about mechanisms that could overcome those shortcomings by adding direction to evolutionary
change. However, neither the biologists nor the Chomskyans felt the need to consider the
shortcomings which Piaget addressed in evolutionary theory. Evolutionary theory was at that time
both influential and indisputable. Moreover, the biologists who participated in the debate included
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the most distinguished evolutionary theorists of that time. Consequently, Piaget had a hard time and
his criticism of evolutionary theory, which he perceived as his contribution to the debate, in fact
placed him outside the debate completely. It was perceived as a non-issue, not worth discussing,
and by insisting on his contribution, Piaget made a fool of himself. In chapter 6, we follow Piaget's
anti-evolutionary arguments, and the answers of the evolutionists in the debate. In the intervening
time, evolutionary theory has been the subject of more criticism. The modern criticism was
foreshadowed by Piaget (cf. chapter 6).
3.2 Chomsky and Fodor's preformism
Chomsky admits wholeheartedly that Piaget's suggestion that his innateness view depends
completely on the evolutionary theory of selection of random mutation is right. However, he
resolutely rejects Piaget's proposition that such a theory itself is implausible:
The evolutionary development is, no doubt, `biologically unexplained'.
However, I know of no reason to believe the stronger contention that it
is `biologically inexplicable' (Chomsky, 1980, p. 36).
While Chomsky knows only a little about evolutionary theory with respect to language (he explicitly
leaves the job of explaining the evolution of the language organ to human biologists, 1975, p. 34), he
embraces evolutionary theory. This makes him a partisan of the biologists in defending the theory
being criticized by Piaget. In arguing for innateness, he `used' the biologists as authorities, making his
argument to some extent an authority argument. Whereas Piaget is aiming at a compromise,
Chomsky is emphasizing the conflict, the controversy.
To Chomsky, Piagetian theory does not explain why people converge on one language in a
very short time on the basis of very little experience, in dissimilar environments, and independently of
their intellectual abilities. To Chomsky the assumption of a genetically determined language faculty is
`no more "question-begging" in the case of mental structures than is the analogous assumption in the
case of growth of physical organs' (1980, pp. 36-37). Both the innateness and the specificity of
language are not hypotheses to Chomsky but rather facts. The task is to observe how a child
proceeds from a genetically determined initial state S0 through a sequence of states S1, S2,.., to a
final, more or less steady state Ss. We assume that when a child has a sufficient record of relevant
experience (E), he or she proceeds to construct a second order hypothesis (a hypothesis about a
hypothesis) as to the character of S0. This hypothesis suffices to account for the transition from S0 to
Ss, given E, for any person. In this way, Chomsky's hypothesis is one about a mapping function,
namely the mapping of E onto Ss. In Chomsky's words, `for any choice of E sufficient to give rise to
knowledge of some human language L, this function must assign an appropriate Ss in which the
grammar of L is represented' (1980, p. 38). Chomsky calls this mapping function the learning theory
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for humans in the domain of language, LT(H,L). Chomsky takes S0 as the specifier of LT(H,L).
Stated more generally, for any domain of investigation (D) in any organism (O) or any species under
consideration there is a potential learning theory, LT(O,D). Of course, quite often it may be the case
that LT is just an empty class - which means that there is no learning involved in the expression of D
to transmit from S1 to Ss.
Before analyzing the assumptions underlying Chomsky's argument in section 2, we will
consider Chomsky's justification for his innateness hypothesis. Chomsky states that the structure of
language is underdetermined by experience. Take the following two sentences:
The dog is here-Is the dog here?
Consider the next two hypothetical rules to describe the (declarative-interrogative or question)
transformation: 
H1: process the declarative from beginning to end (left to right), word
by word, until the first occurrence of the words is, will, is reached and
so on; transpose this occurrence to the beginning (left), forming the
associated interrogative.
H2: same H1, but select the first occurrence of is, will, and so on,
following the first noun phrase of the declarative.
The structure independent rule (H1) is easier to generate than the structure dependent rule (H2),
because H2 requires an analysis into both successive words and abstract phrases such as noun
phrase (a mental construction instead of a physically marked phrase). Now, let's consider the
elaborated sentence:
The dog that is here is small.
H1 predicts wrongly:
Is the dog that here is small.
while H2 predicts correctly
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Is the dog that is here small.
Children never make errors such as predicted by H1, so they must use a rule like H2. If  the process
of acquisition was one of hypotheses formation and confirmation, i.e. of learning, one would expect
to see H1 being tried out first, because it is both the simplest, and the least language specific rule.
The abstract knowledge cannot be derived from experience (E), because there is no way to
conceive of a general learning theory (LT) which does not first consider H1. In describing the
acquisition of knowledge, general learning theories always `explain' the increase in complexity and so
the simple must always precede the complex. This means that LT(H,L) does not explain the
transition from Sn to Sm, and given the argument that was mentioned earlier, the mapping function,
the unexplained features of Sm must be innate. In Chomsky's words: `The child need not consider
H1; it is ruled out by the properties of his initial mental state, S0' (1980, p. 40). Chomsky's
conclusion is that the rules are innate, they cannot be derived from any form of learning (induction,
trial and error). Nor can they be determined by general intelligence, or some kind of general
necessity.
Fodor argued that every mechanism of learning or development that has been put forward
by psychologists and others, is based essentially on inductive extrapolation:
I take it that anybody who has ever given a theory of learning in terms
of mental processes ... has said, in effect, that learning is a matter of
inductive extrapolation, that is, of some form of nondemonstrative
inference ... that any such theory must acknowledge, among the
processes involved in learning, hypothesis formation and confirmation
(Fodor, 1980, p. 145).
So inductive extrapolation contains, among others, the steps of hypothesis formation and
confirmation, or rejection. When a person is learning something, he has to have an idea
(representation) of what has to be learned. A representation of what it might be that has to be
learned has to be present. Whether this input representation conforms to experience will be tested in
the next stage of the process of learning. If it does conform to experience, the hypothesis will be
confirmed, and the input representation will be stored as the output of the learning process (the novel
representation). If the hypothesis does not conform to experience, the process starts again and, if
necessary, will be repeated until the hypothesis generated conforms to experience. That is, a person
must generate ideas about what it might be that has to be learned until he finally generates the right
representation of the novel concept or knowledge. Fodor's point is simple. Given the fact that all
actual learning and developmental processes are critically dependent upon the steps of hypothesis
formation and confirmation outlined above, these processes can only explain the learning of
something that one already knew. As we have seen, the input representation, from which the learning
takes off, is similar to the output representation in factual learning. This means that it is impossible to
learn something new. According to Fodor, it is impossible to learn a concept with no pre-existing
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internal structure, because such a concept cannot be represented in terms of other concepts. For the
so called primitive concepts, it is impossible to make an input representation, and so learning never
gets off the ground. Put slightly differently, it is impossible to generate a hypothesis about such a
concept without invoking the hypothesis itself and since that is the concept that has to be attained,
the paradox follows. In the stage theory of Piaget, the new stage must be represented at some
moment in the old stage. This is impossible, since the new stage transcends the old stage. Therefore,
the knowledge structures of the new stage can never be adequately represented in the poorer
structures of the old stage (see also Fodor, 1975, 1981). With this, developmental psychology has
become superfluous. Fodor concludes that
... there literally isn't such a thing as the notion of learning a
conceptual system richer than the one that one already has; we simply
have no idea of what it would be like to get from a conceptually
impoverished to a conceptually richer system by anything like a process
of learning. Thus there is an important sense in which the nativist
hypothesis is the only one in the field, and the situation has been put
exactly backwards over the last 300 years. The only intelligible theory
of enrichment of conceptual resources is that it is a function of
maturation, and there simply isn't any theory of how learning can
effect concepts (Fodor, 1980, p. 149).
So while Chomsky showed that in the specific case of language acquisition, experience cannot
account for the actual learning (the underdetermination, or poverty of the stimulus argument), Fodor
takes the argument one step further by showing that learning cannot account for the acquisition of
new knowledge in any domain. Although it might be possible to learn to combine concepts or
knowledge in novel ways, it is impossible to learn something new, or to come to a richer logic to
grasp the world, while this is exactly what the theory of Piaget is all about.
3.3 The others
Piattelli-Palmarini (1994) says of the molecular-biologists, the group that I have called the third
party, that they had 'a mere superficial acquaintance with cognitive psychology and linguistics' (p.
321). What they, like Piaget, had in mind was some kind of convergence. For a closer analysis of
what this group knew about Piaget and Chomsky and their expectations, the reader is referred to
Piattelli-Palmarini's analysis (1994).
This third party was somehow invisible, and at the very same time important because
apparently both Chomsky, and Piaget were aiming especially at convincing the biologists who made
up this party. This is not really surprising. The biologists were the pioneers in one of the most
distinguished and innovative sciences of that time. Their approval would really mean something.
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This third group was, and according to Piattelli-Palmarini still is, almost entirely persuaded
by the argumentation of Chomsky and Fodor, and as a consequence they saw Piaget as the loser of
the debate: 'It was a bit painful, at least for some of us at Royaumont, to see him lose an important
confrontation, one which he had eagerly sought, without fully realizing what was happening to him,
and to his most cherished ideas, and why.' (Piattelli-Palmarini, 1994, p. 342). According to Piattelli-
Palmarini (1994, p. 324), the biology of Piaget sounded to the biologists like 'the return of a
nightmare, with his (Piaget's, JWdG) appeal to grand unifying theories, according to which life was
"basically" this or that, instead of being what it, in fact, is.' At the very same time `Chomsky's call for
specificity and his reliance on concrete instances of language were infinitely more appealing' (p.
324). In the 1980 book, and  in his 1994 article, Piattelli-Palmarini draws a picture in which Piaget
is an old man who is no longer completely informed with respect to current issues, and who is
approached with respect: 'The alienation of Piaget from mainstream biology was consummated there
and then; patently, he did not know what he was talking about' (1994, p. 325). In fact, Piattelli-
Palmarini sketches a restricted picture of what was at stake there and then. Piaget strived for
collaboration instead of confrontation; he found the majority against him. As was mentioned before,
nobody felt the need to take Piaget's criticism with respect to evolutionary theory seriously, or to
consider his arguments for adding mechanisms that give direction to the process of evolution.
4 Evaluating the actual debate
The debate is dominated by two issues, on the one hand the origin of the fixed nucleus and, on the
other the specificity of the fixed nucleus. To Piaget, the origin of the fixed nucleus is senso-motor
activity, which is grounded in the affordances and constraints provided by the perceiving and
behaving, the feeling and moving biological mechanism. To Chomsky, a mental organ, which is
unaffected by cognition, general intelligence or senso-motor activity is the direct origin of the fixed
nucleus. The second issue is the specificity of the various mental skills, especially linguistic ones. This
issue concerns Piaget's cognition-first account. Chomsky stresses this again and again: Piaget
wrongly takes the structure of language to be continuous, that is to be a generalization of already
developed senso-motor schemes. Piaget assumes the schemes to be pre-conditions for language, for
instance, by forming the logical premises for linguistic structures like word sequence and so on.
Semantic features, and conceptual relations are the `prime movers' in the process of acquisition,
from which syntax is derived.
Every time one of these two issues is discussed, Piaget patiently repeats his point of view,
seemingly sure that it is all really a non-issue, a misunderstanding. He seems to be relying on the
belief that once he has made his point clear, nobody will need to discuss these particular issues any
longer. To Piaget these issues do not need discussion; it is all so self evident (Piaget defends issue 1
on pp. 81, 149-151, 168, 197; he defends issue 2 only once, on p. 65).
While Piaget did not think these two issues needed discussion, at the same time he failed to
contribute to the discussion concerning any other issue. The contributions mentioned above are his
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only contributions during the whole debate. It seems that Piaget did not go into the debate that he
expected to take place, simply because that particular debate did not take place at all. While Piaget
expected to establish the foundations for convergence, Chomsky and Fodor emphasized those
assumptions of their program that were incompatible with the Piagetian program.
4.1 Please, don't let me be misunderstood
The dominant activity during the debate, at least between Piaget and Chomsky, was
misunderstanding and being misunderstood. Piaget was probably driven to emphasize his point over
and over again by the fact that nobody answered his criticism, or responded to his challenge to
reconsider some basic assumptions of evolutionary theory (see chapter 6). Chomsky must have felt
misunderstood by Piaget, who did not react to his underdetermination argument, although the feeling
that he had won the debate in the eyes of most of the others (the third party) must have eased
Chomsky's pain to a large extent.
In his reaction to Chomsky's `attack', Piaget reacted only to the argument in favor of an
innate fixed nucleus. I think Piaget in fact seriously mistook the potential threat that Chomsky's
arguments posed for his own theory. Instead of reacting to the arguments that forced Chomsky to
take a nativistic stance (especially the argument of underdetermination, and the mapping function
hypothesis), Piaget completely neglected the strong arguments put forward by Chomsky. Like a
friendly old man looking for collaboration instead of conflict, he willingly tried to analyze how
Chomsky arrived at his innateness hypothesis: 'I would like to say that I believe I understand why
Chomsky proposed this hypothesis: simply because it is a common opinion to presuppose that a
behavior is more stable if it is firmly rooted, that is, if it is hereditary and not simply a product of
autoregulation' (p. 57 and further). It seems to me that this reaction must have been quite frustrating
to Chomsky because it makes clear that Piaget was not paying any attention to his arguments at all.
In my opinion, the feeling of not being understood by Piaget drove Chomsky to restate his position
again and again. Apparently few of the Piagetians seem to get the point that Chomsky stressed time
after time. Chomsky generated many different empirical examples like the one stated above with
respect to mistakes that would be expected if language acquisition were driven by some kind of LT,
or logical necessity but which are nonetheless never found in the actual speech of developing
language users (for instance pp. 41, 44, 48, 120, 319). All these examples indicate that one has to
assume abstract knowledge structures, which cannot be derived from senso-motor experience or
general intelligence.
Let's take a look at the arguments so far presented. Chomsky has given a strong and
persuasive argument against the Piagetian view that language is derived solely from senso-motor
skills and general intelligence (cognition-first assumption). Piaget in particular seems to
misunderstand the core of this argument. Put more informally, Chomsky attacked Piaget's front door
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(the cognition-first hypothesis), while Piaget was defending his back door (his assumption of self-
organization by assimilation and accommodation), although that particular door was not as yet under
attack. In this way Piaget stayed out of the battle. He never responded to the problems that
Chomsky identifies with any kind of LT, including his own cognition-first theory. He only rejected
Chomsky's conclusion that language must be innate. To make the matter even more complicated, the
biologists attacked Piaget's assumption of the inappropriateness of an evolutionary theory that does
not assume some kind of mechanism accounting for direction, even though this discussion did not
really strengthen Chomsky's attack. In this way, although I think he was right in stressing that
innateness is not warranted (more on this later). Piaget never participated in the discussion. This is
why I question whether it is appropriate to speak of the debate between Piaget and Chomsky.
4.2 Falsification of Piaget's cognition-first assumption
Apparently, Piaget did not understand the abstract problems with his theory, or more specifically, his
developmental psychological or cognition-first assumption, that were identified by Chomsky. To
persuade Piaget, one could try to falsify his theory on empirical grounds. Monod comes up with a
proposal on how this could be done: 'if the development of language in the child is closely related to
senso-motor experience, one can suppose that a child born paraplegic, for example, would have
very great difficulties in developing his language' (p. 140). The answer of Inhelder is that very little
experience will do the job. Then Fodor concludes: 'But then, why not say that any case of
ethological triggering, any case where an arbitrary action is innately connected with a highly
developed scheme of intelligence would count as learning? But that merely trivializes the doctrine
that intelligence arises out of senso-motor activity, and there is really hardly anything left.' (p. 141).
In this case senso-motor experience is only a `trigger' (not necessarily isomorphous, or analogous to
the structure that puts it on the move). Again neither Piaget, nor most of the Piagetians, seem to get
the core of Fodor's perfectly clear argument. This surprising ignorance makes Fodor say, that there
are other candidates for triggers, which are no means less probable than senso-motor: 'God does it
for you on Tuesdays, or you do it by falling on your head, or it is innate' (p. 155).
5 Concluding section 1: a winner or a non-debate?
Chomsky successfully attacked the cognition-first assumption of Piaget's developmental psychology
but was unable to impress and persuade Piaget. Piaget was only willing to discuss his biological
assumptions. In this way Piaget was avoiding having to take part in the actual ongoing debate.
However, in Piaget's defence, it can be said that it has apparently never been clear to anyone what
the debate should have been about. Chomsky and Fodor benefitted from Piaget's rather remote
attitude towards the debate; they persuaded almost everyone else.
Had Piaget brought his ontological expertise (i.e. his ability to theorize about development
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and epistemology) to the debate, however, the picture could have been completely different. In the
next section, I shall try to find arguments that seriously weaken the strength of Chomsky's
arguments. Where possible, I try to link those arguments to arguments (which can be extrapolated)
from Piagetian theory. The debate has been characterized as an initial milestone in the field of
cognitive science (Gardner, in Piattelli-Palmarini, 1994). Chomskyan thinking, as a matter of fact, is
in perfect accordance with traditional artificial intelligence (AI), as will be shown in the next section.
After outlining the underlying ideas of 'classic' AI, especially the idea of (Turing) computation based
on rules and representations, we will see the grounds on which this form of cognitive science has
been criticized recently in the field of artificial cognitive science. Moreover, most of the current
criticisms are in agreement with Piaget's developmental assumptions.
Section II: a discussion of the assumptions underlying the winning
position
By using the 'fighting-at-the-front-and-back-door' metaphor, I tried to illustrate how the actual
debate was only an apparent debate, which consequently makes the case a mockery. Each man was
fighting on a different ground, trying to save his own pet theory, which for Chomsky was his inborn
rule system, and for Piaget his epigenism. In the next section of this chapter, the debaters will no
longer directly speak for themselves. Instead, I will focus on the (implicit) assumptions which
underlay the arguments presented in the debate. Because of the dominant role played by Chomsky
(and Fodor), the arguments which will be analyzed will be mainly those of Chomsky and Fodor (the
arguments of Piaget will be further analyzed in chapter 6). Fodor was explicit in his presentation of
the assumptions underlying his and Chomsky's ideas, in fact the Chomskyans did not really need
Chomsky to conduct their debate. In short, the following is an analysis of the implicit assumptions
underlying the arguments which were made the core of the debate by Chomsky and his followers.
From the very beginning of the debate, Piaget was left out, and he will consequently stay out of the
ensuing 'debate'.
In the discussion that I want to present, there are no winners. While Chomsky's theory is, as
will be outlined below, in line with classic AI, classic AI has attracted a lot of criticism focussed
specifically on the assumptions shared by Chomsky. To conclude, Chomsky was able to use AI
arguments which were not seen as questionable at that time. However, at present those arguments
are no longer perceived to be valid.
6 Holistic principles versus decomposable specificity
From an evolutionary perspective - describing the developmental pathway from the protozoa to very
complex organisms like man - biological systems must have started as rather holistic reactions
towards the outer world, which became increasingly differentiated or specialized. There is something
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paradoxical about this. As a rule evolution is economical. Why then should systems become
increasingly complex, instead of changing along only one dimension? Why differentiation, resulting in
the constant emergence of new hierarchical levels (organs and sub-organs), all of which must be
kept adaptive? Evolution, being economical, would rather make subsystems contend with each other
than add new ones (i.e. it would rather throw neurons away than add new ones), and yet evolution is
a description of a pathway from simplicity - the protozoa - to complexity - for instance, man. This
'paradox' addresses the holism-decomposition dichotomy. Holism focuses on how whole organisms
become increasingly intricate, whereas decomposition focuses on how the most adaptive subsystems
function and are selected in evolution. Piaget can be viewed as representing the holism pole. His
mechanism of adaptation through accommodation and assimilation tries to account for the increasing
complexity (differentiation and hierarchical integration) of cognition. Chomsky and Fodor, on the
other hand, represent the decomposition pole, trying to decompose skills into the collaboration of
more or less (atomistic) sub-systems or modules. They try to account for language from a selection
view. A theory of evolution must, in principle, account for both holism and decomposition; both
poles are 'observables' of the living. In order to deal with the opposition between holism and
decomposition, such a theory must explain the interaction between the evolutionary and the
ontogenetic level (between the whole and the parts). With Chomsky and Fodor, we could easily
adopt the belief that complete cognitive skills or abilities can be performed only because they can be
decomposed into individual parts or features of the system, which came into being on the
evolutionary timescale. However, whenever confronted with the fact that many cognitive processes
are deceptively simple and effortless, we may conclude with Piaget that these processes are
governed by holistic principles, not necessarily inborn in an evolutionary blueprint, but at least to
some extent dependent on the 'organization by "systems" with their "global dynamics"' (Piaget, 1980,
p. 282), dependent on (physical) laws instead of genetic blueprints. In the words of Brian Goodwin
(1994, p. 35): 'Knowing the molecular composition of something is not, in general, sufficient to
determine its form. This follows from basic physics. We also need to know the principles of
organization that are involved in the system to explain what forms it can take.' It was those principles
that were of the greatest concern to Piaget. Let us look more closely at the option of decomposition
and specificity. Piaget's option will be considered in detail in chapter 6.
6.1 Decomposition decomposed
Both Chomsky and Fodor, and many modern infant researchers, rely on decomposition and
specificity. That is, they try to decompose a particular behavioral or cognitive whole into behavioral
or cognitive primitives, which either are no longer determined by experience, or have no internal
structure of their own (which can no longer be divided into behavioral or cognitive sub-systems).
Remember Fodor's primitives, concepts with no further internal structure, which could not be
represented in terms of other concepts. Decomposing concepts or behaviors into primitives aims at
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isolating those concepts, knowledge or behaviors, which must be preexisting in evolution1, because
they cannot depend on ontogenetic learning (remember both Chomsky's underdetermination
argument, and Fodor's argument about the impossibility of making an input representation about a
primitive). For instance, from the observation that very young children with no appropriate
experience seem to be surprised whenever confronted with impossible occurences, like two solid
bodies moving through each other on a computer screen, it is assumed that innate primitives
consisting of knowledge and representations dictate the feeling of surprise (cf. Spelke, 1992, more
on this in chapter 5).
Primitives are combined by applying innate rules, for instance the rule 'If (condition) you
observe an event which is represented in the matrix of primitives which is labeled 'impossible', then
(action) be surprised'. Since two solid bodies moving through each other is an item in this matrix,
and you actually see two bodies move through each other, you must perform the behavioral primitive
'be surprised'. More generally, the assumed innate rules are conditional algorithms, consisting of the
form:
Algorithmx If Condition1..n is an element of Matrixinborn then Action1..n, else Ax
This so called rule-governed composition, or more technically, computation of representational
content, is taken to account for the immediacy of, for instance, the visual recognition of a great
variety of patterns, or interactions. Chomsky and Fodor thus take the innate structures, the fixed
nucleus, to contain representational content (primitives). Applying computational theory to cognition
allows it to be decomposed into its individual parts: rules and representations. More precisely,
cognition can be decomposed into conditional algorithmical rules, which are there to be applied to
encodings of the outer world. When representational content is assigned to the innate structures
(primitives), the encoding relation becomes essential. The encoding relation is the relation between
actual things in the outer world and the primitives (that is the representational content which is
assumed to represent those actual things).
There is something wrong with this representational view of the fixed nucleus. Just as some
of us attribute our knowledge/ emotions to our computers (`the wicked thing makes a mistake'),
representational theorists make the error of assigning the semantics of the observer to the system
being observed. Our knowledge of the world is injected into the system, and thus we explain the
functioning of the system by lending to the system our own understanding, making our theory circular
(see chapter 3; see also Keijzer, 1997; Keijzer & de Graaf, 1994). In short, representationalists like
Chomsky and Fodor explain the functioning of a system by assigning to it their own knowledge of
the world; they can be seen as epistemic agents outside the system who define an encoding relation
that can only exist for observers, and not for the system under consideration itself. To justify this
                    
    1Fodor and Chomsky were in agreement with the molecular
biologist who had isolated DNA, which was then perceived as the
primitive of biological form. It was not surprising that Piaget's
skepticism about the conception of DNA as the primitive -
replicator - of life was not welcomed by the molecular-biological
participants of the debate.
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statement we must focus on computational theory, on the superclass of 'primitive operating' theories
of which the theories of Chomsky and Fodor are instances. I shall illustrate this issue by means of
the classic example of computation: Turing computation.
6.2 Accounting for representational content: Turing and encodinism
A Turing machine consists of internal states, and a head which can read a tape, move it to the left or
right and write on it. The actions of a Turing machine are completely determined by the internal
states, and by the input from the tape. In this particular context, computation can be defined as
anything that can be carried out on a Turing machine. Turing machines can carry out any algorithm;
for any mechanical formal system there is a formally equivalent Turing machine. It follows from this
thesis that, to study an actual system, one only needs to consider the functionally equivalent Turing
machine. Stated slightly differently, because the Turing machine is an abstraction, the physical
realization is irrelevant. The only thing that counts is the steps that are carried out. The form of each
step and the time it takes are irrelevant. Chomsky's nativism is (implicitly) grounded upon this thesis.
The universal grammar is a formal system which is taken to be independent of its actual realization.
Chomsky does have something to say about the 'hardware'. It contains UG as 'a species-specific,
genetically determined property' (1975, p. 79, see further Chomsky, 1965, 1980a) but he leaves the
factual study of the hardware to biology: `(T)he theory of UG, is an innate property of the human
mind. In principle, we should be able to account for it in terms of human biology' (1975, p. 34).
Turing machines have abstract properties, for instance the property, already mentioned, that
for any automatic formal system there is a formally equivalent Turing machine. If further
extrapolated, this property leads to universality, stating that for any number of different Turing
machines, there is a more universal Turing machine. This property, of course, leads to the postulation
of a completely universal Turing machine, which can compute anything that can be carried out on
any other Turing machine. Chomsky's universality principle must be understood on the basis of this
assumption. That is, Chomsky and Fodor consider (possible) existing languages to be instances of a
universal Turing Machine. Technically stated, languages are thought of as finite Turing Machines; the
universal Turing Machine (Universal Grammar) is assumed to be able to compute every possible
language, viewing every possible language as a particular manifestation of the total of possible
manifestations captured by universal language (universal grammar). This makes Chomsky's view a
case of class theory, just like Turing's theory. Of course this is in sharp contrast to Piaget's
developmental views, because in class theory, there simply is no place for development. Every
potential form is just a manifestation of a preexisting fixed class. Consequently, development must be
exchanged for selection, and this viewpoint signifies the bankruptcy of developmental psychology.
Taking a computational stance on cognition, that is, applying Turing's abstraction to
psychology, allows cognition to be studied at the algorithmic level, without considering the actual
underlying device in detail. In line with this, as we have seen, Chomsky leaves the task of explaining
the postulated underlying device, the mental organ, to biologists. Cognition is taken to be
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computation on representations, or symbol structures; cognition is symbol manipulation (see
Chomsky, 1980b).
There are, of course, good reasons to take a computational stance. Both logic and language
employ representations - symbols. These representations enable us to manipulate our world in its
physical absence, and this seems to be exactly the cognitive skill that has carried man beyond other
animals. A more practical argument in favor of representation, or symbols, is that nobody ever
perceives an object from exactly the same angle twice. No two stimulus situations are exactly
identical, and yet we experience an object, say an elephant, perceived from many different angles as
one and the same. In postulating one representation, we can abstract away from the extreme
diversity and variety with which the elephant can meet the eye. Thus, a representational theory of
mind seems intuitively plausible.
However, computational psychology also reveals some major problems (e.g. Brooks,
1991), for instance with respect to a lack of fault or noise tolerance, and the inability of systems built
within the computational framework to perform adequately in novel situations. I will not discuss this
criticism to any substantial extent here, because I will return to it in chapter 3. For the moment I will
only discuss the novelty problem, because it was central to the Chomsky-Piaget debate.
As we have just seen, to computationalists, cognition is symbol manipulation. Given a set of
rules, stored within the system, the symbols on the endless tape that pass the read-write head are
manipulated in a completely determined manner. For symbols to be 'understood' they must be
encoded. Everything that happens in the outside world, on the endless tape of the Turing machine,
must be encoded by the system. Computationalism depends on representations. Representations
derive their meaning or definition by explicating the encoding relation. In order for an outer
presentation (an actual event) to be connected accurately to a corresponding primitive or
configuration of primitives, the primitives must pre-exist within the system (this is the innateness
assumption). However, from Fodor's learning paradox we are able to derive that the encoding
relation must be pre-existing as well, for it would be impossible to imagine any learning rule which
could reliably explain the emergence of the mapping of any real event or object (presentation) onto
its corresponding set of primitives. In other words, encodings can never cross from outside the
system to inside the system. Whenever an observer 'injects' his understanding of an actual event into
the cognitive system, by assuming that this very same understanding is encoded in a corresponding
innate (set of) representational primitive(s), this is not an instance of transfer from outside the system
to inside the system. In short, the novelty problem is due to the notion of encoding, because of the
already mentioned circularity which stems from explaining the functioning of a system by assigning to
that system our own understanding of the world. I shall show how Fodor's arguments can be used
against his own position.
Once again, let us reformulate Fodor's learning paradox in terms of encoding more
precisely. Encoding can be a proper foundation only for representational content when the relation
between the encoding and the encoded is already known (for the actual thing we call a car, there
must exist an internal representation which co-varies in an appropriate way with the functioning of
the actual thing). In this way encodings cannot provide new content (of course, encodings can be
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used to alter the form of already available contents, just as was the case in combining primitives into
a new content: thunder, rain and wind together make up the concept of thunderstorm). In line with
Fodor's argument, we can continue by stating that in order to impose representational content on
anything environmental - outside the system in consideration - this content must have been present
beforehand within the system for the encoding relation to have been defined. In Fodor's words, you
can only learn what you already knew, experience can only select the appropriate inborn
representation. From this, it follows that encoding can neither cross from inside to outside the
system. While epistemology aims at accounting for the emergence of new knowledge, new
representations, or new skills, encoding theories (or more generally, the class of information
processing theories, see chapter 4) just cannot do the job. That is, they cannot provide an account
of the emergence of novelty.
To summarize the problem, we expect a meaningful relationship between internal symbols
and things in the world outside which can be the subjects of our experiences. When a dog is seen
we may hope that the appropriate internal symbol 'dog' will be activated or, the other way round, if
we have to activate the internal symbol 'dog' we must hope that the content which is activated is a
dog instead of, for instance, a `guitar' or a 'thunderstorm'. In order to have such a meaningful
relationship between internal symbol and activated or activating content or thing from the world
outside, it is neccesary to assume some similarity - correspondence - between the internal symbol
and the outside phenomenon, because only on basis of such correspondence the meaningful
relationship can be deduced. This means that the central features of the internal symbol, making it a
symbol for 'dog', must also be central features of the dog itself. Just because representationalism
assumes the central features to be features of the symbol - not of the dog - there is no basis for any
correspondence and, of course, also no basis for a meaningful relationship between the outside
phenomenon and the internal symbol. Such a relationship is, by defenition, completely accidental
(eventually emerged on basis of biological selection). But if the relationship is accidental, there is no
representation in the specific (representationalism) meaning. Representationalism assumes that the
features that are characteristic for `dog' are not a part of the (experience of a) dog itself: if these
charactaristics could be part of experiencing a dog, there would be no reason to deny the possibility
that these characteristics could cross from outside to inside by experience. In this case, the
characteristics need not be internal in advance of experience. However, as we have seen, exactly the
idea of characteristics crossing from outside to inside by experience is denied in representationalism.
In short, there are two possibilities. First, we can assume that symbols, characteristics etc. can cross
from ouside to inside. Second, we can assume that the relationship between the ouside phenomenon
and the activated internal symbol is completely accidental. In representationalism, both possibilities
are denied, leading us to conclude that representationalism is internally inconsistent or, at least, that it
does not provide an answer to the problem that it aims to solve. This conclusion does not imply that
the alternative - self-organization, Piagetian construction - is right. However, in spite of the
conclusions of the debate in 1975, it is important to investigate whether or not the alternative is as
bad as it was taken to be during the debate and whether or not it is able to provide an answer to the
identified problems of representationalism.
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Chomsky and Fodor state that all basic representations must be innate, since there is no way
for new basic concepts to be learned or developed. For any possible actual thing which is
represented within the system, an appropriate encoding must pre-exist within the system in order for
the encoding relation to have been defined, since encodings (primitive concepts) cannot pass from
outside to inside. The encodings must pre-exist within the system because there is no other way to
get them there (remember the learning paradox and the underdetermination argument). To Chomsky
and Fodor, the burden is placed on learning, or developing, rather than on theories of
representation. In fact, however, the problem is a logical problem having to do with representation,
or stated in a slightly more sophisticated way, with encodings (the key notion of information
processing). This problem cannot be solved by evolution any better than by learning or development
(see chapters 3, 4, and 5). Representationism, based on a defined encoding relation, cannot account
for its own basic encodings and therefore cannot be the whole story. But if, as Chomsky and Fodor
claim, ontogeny, i.e. learning, cannot account for the basic encodings, how could evolution succeed
in accounting for them? From this we are led to conclude that representations would be impossible if
encoding theory were correct, for there could never be a mechanism that could enable the system
endogenously to make up an encoding of something actually happening. And if such a mechanism
could possibly exist, why could it not be an ontogenetical mechanism? Not only do Chomsky and
Fodor, in line with classic AI, skip ontology, they also have nothing to contribute to epistemology,
while epistemology was of the greatest concern, of course, to Piaget. According to him,
epistemology was what the debate ought to be about. In fact, the debate was never a debate about
epistemology.
7 Conclusion
Chomsky turned the debate into a debate about the underdetermination of language by learning.
Chomsky and Fodor dominated the debate with their underdetermination argument, and Piaget was
unsuccessful in upsetting this argument. So in the actual debate Chomsky and Fodor were the
winners. However, after evaluating the implicit assumptions underlying the Chomskyan arguments, I
attempted to qualify the victory of Chomsky and Fodor. Chomsky and Fodor could present their
arguments in full sail, endorsed by the then prevailing opinions derived from computational theory,
which also underlaid the ideas of the molecular biologists. If computational theory today had the
same credibility as it did in the seventies, nothing would have changed and there would be no reason
to re-open and reconsider the Chomsky-Piaget debate. However, in the intervening years the
encoding relation aspect of computational theory (representation) in particular has attracted criticism
which cannot be resolved within computational theorizing itself. Maybe Piaget was already aware of
the problematic assumptions of computational theory (more on this in chapter 6) but, in 1975, his
criticism only decreased his own credibility. Although Piaget was not able to overthrow the
underdetermination argument, his approach is to a large extent free from the problems currently
identified in computational theory.
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Piaget stressed over and over again that novelty shows up repeatedly during ontogeny, and
that because of the centrality of novelty in ontogeny, development is possible. Current theorizing in
developmental biology, which, like Piaget places ontogeny at the center of evolution, suggests that
Piaget's reasoning offers a way out of the problems identified in computational theory. For the
moment we are led to conclude that it is justified to reopen the debate, to bring new data to the
case, and to restructure the debate on the basis of the current state of the art in developmental
biology. This is justified in particular by the fact that, in the actual debate, the most important expert
witnesses were also biologists. So wherever biologists have changed their arguments, this may have
a retrospective effect on the discussion in the seventies. Although the victory of Chomsky and Fodor
over Piaget was to be expected, for the moment we may conclude that it is still possible that Piaget
lost the debate not because he was wrong, but because the biological theorizing during the debate
was invalid.
To Piaget, both ontology, and epistemology were of central importance. Piaget did get it
wrong with respect to his cognition-first assumption. Maybe it can be held against Piaget that he did
not understand Chomsky's and Fodor's falsification of his cognition-first assumption. However, his
biological assumptions, for instance with respect to self-organization, and his rejection of innate
representations, are not as silly as Piattelli-Palmarini (1994) makes them appear to be. They are in
line with some serious points of criticism against AI that have recently been expressed for instance in
developmental biology (more on this in chapter 6). In accordance with synergetics, Piaget dealt with
qualitative changes, patterns or coherent actions, on macroscopic scales, which are produced by the
cooperative behavior of individual parts of the system, called the microlevels. Piaget (1985) believed
that the general relationships between micro- and macro-levels can be finally formulated as
mathematical laws. This belief is shared by modern researchers, especially those who are working
within the framework of the theory of dynamic systems. Haken states it most clearly: 'synergetics can
be considered as a general theory of the emergence of new qualities (including new percepts,
thoughts etc.)' (Haken, 1990, p. 3).
While Chomsky and Fodor did an excellent job in identifying the problems within Piaget's
theory by focussing on the issue of the underdetermination of language by any form of learning, and
experience, they did not propose a fruitful alternative. Their lack of interest in ontology - Chomsky
leaves the task of designing scenarios that explain how the language organ has evolved to biologists,
and to Fodor it would even be all right if God had done it on Tuesday - has confronted us with even
larger problems: if encoding theory is a proper epistemology, representations are impossible. To
avoid throwing the baby out with the bath water, Chomsky and Fodor must take an epistemological
(or developmental) position. This is what, I hope, I have made clear.
In chapter 3, we illustrate the arguments presented in this chapter in the domain of language
acquisition. In the next chapter (chapter 4), we go back in history in order to elaborate on what I
assume to be the hard core problem in the debate: the difference between a process perspective
(Piaget) and an entity perspective (Chomsky and Fodor). This excursion is of importance because
the recent shift from entity to process thinking in developmental biology has thrown a completely
new light on the actual debate. In chapter 4, we take up the debate and reconstruct it against the
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background supported by modern data from biology.
